Watson v. U.S.
Watson, Michael v. U.S.
If a defendant receives a gun in exchange for drugs, has he “used” the gun under the terms of the federal drug law? The Supreme Court has concluded, in Watson v. United States, No. 06-571, that the answer is no.
The issue had divided courts of appeals across the country in the fourteen years since the Justices decided the flip side of the question – that one who provides a gun to pay for drugs has “used” the weapon.
The Court concluded that the ordinary meaning of "using" a firearm, as referred to in the federal drug trafficking statute, could not be stretched to include receipt of a gun. It acknowledged that its result created an asymmetry, in which the defendant who trades a gun for drugs is covered by the statute while his trading partner is not. But it explained that its role was to interpret the words of the statute and leave Congress to amend those words if it wished a different result.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg decried the ill fit between the Court's holding in Watson and the holding in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) that trading a gun was using it. Nevertheless, she joined the opinion after reevaluating Smith and concluding that it had been wrongly decided, and that it should be overruled. In her concurrence, she pointed to Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent in Smith as the right approach.
The case began in 2004, when Michael Watson, a 55-year-old man who is legally blind, furnished an undercover government agent with 24 doses of OxyContin, and received an unloaded pistol in exchange. He was immediately arrested and ultimately charged with several drug counts, including “use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense.”
Watson pleaded guilty, but reserved the right to appeal whether receipt of a gun constituted “use” under the federal drug law. The Fifth Circuit held that it did, falling in line with the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Had Watson traded his OxyContin for a gun in the Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh or D.C. Circuit, he would have been exonerated of the gun charge.
The confusion stems from the high Court’s opinions in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) and Smith. In Smith, a divided court held that if a defendant brings a gun to a drug deal and barters with it to obtain drugs, he has “used” the gun. Justice Scalia and two other Justices dissented, arguing that “bartering” with a gun is not the same as “using” it. The Court attempted to clarify the meaning of the word “use” in Bailey, expaining that it requires “active employment” of a gun.
In the etymologistic gymnastics that have ensued, several lower courts have reasoned that while bargaining with a firearm may be use, bargaining for a firearm is not. According to the D.C. Circuit, if a person who “pays a cashier a dollar for a cup of coffee in the courthouse cafeteria” has not “used” the coffee, a person who “pays for a gun with drugs” has not “used” the gun. United States v. Stewart, 246 F.3d 728, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
In contrast, some courts hold that trading drugs for a gun is a “use” of the gun because it is “an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.” United States v. Ulloa, 94 F.3d 949, 956 (5th Cir. 1996).
In his petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, Watson suggested that he did not set out to deal drugs, but merely to obtain a gun for his safety. However, according to the government, a search of his home revealed a cache of other guns and additional drugs.
Appealed From: 5th Circuit Court of Appeals (July 25, 2006)Petition for certiorari - Watson