Raygor, Lance & Goodchild, James v. Regents of the University of Minnesota (02/27/2002)

Questions presented: Is the tolling provision of the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. @ 1367(d), insofar as it applies to a state defendant, unconstitutional because it violates the 11th Amendment's prohibition against claims against unconsenting states?

BY ERIN KILLIAN, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

Lance Raygor was 53 years old when he was asked by the University of Minnesota to choose between early retirement and being laid off.

James Goodchild was 52 years old when he was offered the same choice.

Both men were senior radio and television broadcast technicians. Raygor had worked there for 27 years, Goodchild for 26 years.

Both men refused to take early retirement.

The University of Minnesota reclassified Raygor and Goodchild as radio and television broadcast technicians, cut their salaries by between $15,000 and $20,000 and altered their shifts.

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers union, to which Raygor and Goodchild belonged, has a "Rule of 75" collective bargaining agreement, holding that if the employees time served and age equaled 75, the workers could be offered an early retirement package.

Raygor and Goodchild, however, contend they were instead forced into miserable working conditions.

Goodchild left the University of Minnesota, and Raygor stayed on for a couple of months. Howard Bolter, Raygor and Goodchilds attorney, said, "[Goodchild] was a mess. He ended up going to see a psychiatrist; he was completely disabled."

In August 1995, both Raygor and Goodchild filed charges of discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights. The department dismissed the claims on July 17, 1996, and wrote the men letters, suggesting they bring civil suits against the university within 45 days of receipt of the letters.

On Aug. 30, 1996, Raygor and Goodchild filed separate claims in federal district court, alleging violations of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). Their actions were consolidated. The university answered, raising 11th Amendment immunity as its defense and moving to dismiss the case.

The 11th Amendment bars suits in federal court against a state by citizens of that state or any other state.

The federal court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice on July 14, 1997. Though Raygor and Goodchild appealed, the appeal was stayed pending a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents , which also addressed whether a federal discrimination claim against a state is barred by the 11th Amendment.

At the same time, Raygor and Goodchild re-filed in state court under supplemental jurisdiction, alleging age discrimination under Minnesotas human rights law. The university moved to dismiss, claiming the states 45-day statute of limitations had tolled.

The 45 days relates to the time a person receives the notice form the Minnesota Human Rights Department dismissing the claims.

However, under supplemental jurisdiction, a tolling provision exists that states that while a state claim is pending in federal court, the time limit does not run out. The tolling provision allows for an extra 30 days to file.

Minnesota's district court ruled in favor of the university that because the11th Amendment protects the University from federal claims when the university did not consent to federal jurisdiction, the federal district court could not exercise jurisdiction over the supplemental MHRA claims, and Raygor and Goodchild's choice to pursue claims in federal court did not justify equitable tolling.

Raygor and Goodchild appealed.

On Jan. 11, 2000, the State of Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed.

"With respect to the appellants conduct, the lack of clarity and clear precedent on the issues involved justifies equitable tolling. We cannot fault appellants for failing to simultaneously file identical lawsuits in federal and state courts," Judge Roger Klaphake wrote in the unanimous opinion. "At the time appellants brought their action in federal district court, federal law was unclear on whether a state was entitled to 11th Amendment immunity from ADEA claims. Indeed, federal circuits are split on this issue, and since the filing of appellants' lawsuit, the Eighth Circuit has taken a minority position and held that the Eleventh Amendment defense is available on ADEA claims against a state."

The Minnesota Supreme Court went the other way, unanimously reversing. The states highest court held that its district court had not abused its discretion in ruling that equitable tolling did not apply, and therefore, that the claims were not timely filed.

Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz wrote, "In reversing the district court, the court of appeals did not discuss the district courts analysis or provide any reason to conclude the district court abused its discretion. Our careful review of the record compels the conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied respondents the remedy of equitable tolling."

On June 4, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, and on Oct. 29, the Court granted the Solicitor General permission to participate in the argument.

On Feb. 27, 2002, the Court, by a 6-3 vote, affirmed, holding for the University of Minnesota that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute does not toll the limitations period for state law claims asserted against nonconsenting state defendants that are dismissed on 11th Amendment grounds.

Sandra Day O' Connor wrote the majority opinion. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the dissent, in which Justices David Souter and Stephen Breyer joined.