CBOCS West v. Humphries

One Term after taking on race issues in a deeply divisive school desegregation case, the Court will again weigh in on the subject in the employment context.

The case, CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, No. 06-1431, raises the question whether federal civil rights law permits workers to bring retaliation claims against employers. It was brought by Hendrick Humphries, an African-American, who was an associate manager at a Cracker Barrel restaurant owned by CBOCS.

After he was fired, Humphries filed a lawsuit claiming discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C Section 1981. In his suit, Humphries alleged that one supervisor made overtly discriminatory remarks about African Americans and Mexican Americans, and vowed to give preferential treatment to white employees.

Subsequently, when a supervisor fired an African-American waitress for offenses that were allegedly tolerated from white waitresses, Humphries complained to a district manager. That manager did not welcome Humphries's intervention. Shortly thereafter, one of Humphries's supervisors claimed that he left a safe in the restaurant unlocked overnight, and fired him without further investigation. Humphries claimed that he was terminated to avenge his effort to promote a colorblind workplace.

Section 1981, which derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, states in part that "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."

The Supreme Court indicated in 1989 that the statute, which protects citizens' right to "make and enforce" contracts, including employment contracts, does not explicitly state a cause of action for post-contract behavior such as retaliation against those who speak up against employment discrimination. In response to that holding, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), Congress amended Section 1981 in 1991.

In the sixteen years since that amendment, the federal circuit courts have still been unable to reach a uniform position on whether the statute entitles workers to sue their employers for retaliation.

Humphries lost his case in federal district court but on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Section 1981 does protect against retaliation. Judges Ann Williams and Richard Posner reasoned that Congress intended to repudiate the Court's narrow, text-driven view of the law.

In dissent, Judge Frank Easterbrook observed that plaintiffs are permitted to sue for retaliation under Title VII. A lenient interpretation of Section 1981 would simply give them an incentive to sidestep the time-limits and procedurally complex requirements of Title VII.

The case is likely to be argued in early 2008.

One term after taking on race issues in a deeply divisive school desegregation case, the Supreme Court again weighed in on the subject in the employment context.

The case, CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, No. 06-1431, raises the question whether federal civil rights law permits workers to bring retaliation claims against employers. It was brought by Hendrick Humphries, an African-American, who was an associate manager at a Cracker Barrel restaurant owned by CBOCS.

After he was fired, Humphries filed a lawsuit claiming discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C Section 1981. In his suit, Humphries alleged that one supervisor made overtly discriminatory remarks about African Americans and Mexican Americans, and vowed to give preferential treatment to white employees.

Subsequently, when a supervisor fired an African-American waitress for offenses that were allegedly tolerated from white waitresses, Humphries complained to a district manager. That manager did not welcome Humphries's intervention. Shortly thereafter, one of Humphries's supervisors claimed that he left a safe in the restaurant unlocked overnight, and fired him without further investigation. Humphries claimed that he was terminated to avenge his effort to promote a colorblind workplace.

Section 1981, which derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, states in part that "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."

The Supreme Court indicated in 1989 that the statute, which protects citizens' right to "make and enforce" contracts, including employment contracts, does not explicitly state a cause of action for post-contract behavior such as retaliation against those who speak up against employment discrimination. In response to that holding, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), Congress amended Section 1981 in 1991.

In the 16 years since that amendment, the federal circuit courts have still been unable to reach a uniform position on whether the statute entitles workers to sue their employers for retaliation.

Humphries lost his case in federal district court but on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Section 1981 does protect against retaliation. Judges Ann Williams and Richard Posner reasoned that Congress intended to repudiate the Court's narrow, text-driven view of the law.

In dissent, Judge Frank Easterbrook observed that plaintiffs are permitted to sue for retaliation under Title VII. A lenient interpretation of Section 1981 would simply give them an incentive to sidestep the time-limits and procedurally complex requirements of Title VII.

On May 27, the Supreme Court upheld the Seventh Circuit's decision, relying on past decisions and legislative intent.

"We agree with CBOCS that the statute's language does not expressly refer to the claim of an individual (black or white) who suffers retaliation because he has tried to help a different individual, suffering direct racial discrimination, secure his §1981 rights. But that fact alone is not sufficient to carry the day," Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote for the majority. "After all, this Court has long held that the statutory text of §1981’s sister statute, §1982, provides protection from retaliation for reasons related to the enforcement of the express statutory right."

Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, filed a dissenting opinion.

"The court does not even purport to identify any basis in the statutory text for the 'well-embedded interpretation [of the law]' it adopts for the first time today," Thomas asserted.