U.S. v. Benitez, Carlos (06/14/2004)

Questions presented: Whether, in order to show that a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 constitutes reversible plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that he would not have pleaded guilty if the violation had not occurred?

BY BETH SHAYNE, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

On March 13, 2000, Carlos Benitez stood before a U.S. District judge in Central California to hear his official sentence for conspiring to possess and distribute methamphetamine.

The previous May, he and two friends had been busted with a plastic bag and a shoebox full of methamphetamine, drugs Benitez confessed they planned to sell to a man who turned out to be an undercover informant. Benitez confessed during interrogation by police. The charges carried a hefty mandatory minimum sentence 10 years in prison.

In October after his arrest, Benitez had signed a guilty plea agreement to reduce his prison time from 10 years to something closer to six or seven. It was a "Type B" plea agreement, the only type that is binding and irreversible once signed. In the process of negotiating it, he filed a request for a change of counsel. The court denied his request, but he persisted with two letters begging the court to reconsider, saying he did not want to go to trial, but his lawyer was encouraging him to sign a plea offer he "did not feel [was] appropriate."

At sentencing, only one paper truly mattered: the accused, the counsel and the Spanish interpreter assigned to the case all signed off on the guilty plea, and so, in March, Benitez looked to his interpreter in court to translate what he knew would be bad news.

In a moment, the news went from bad to worse. All plea agreements are up to the discretion of the court, but this one included a "safety valve," a clause that said more than one previous conviction would void it altogether. The judge had informed Benitez of both these loopholes in open session and, according to the transcript, he told the judge he understood them. When the sentence came down, the judge activated the escape clause, pointing to five prior convictions, two of them under a different name, and ordered Benitez to serve the mandatory minimum of 10 years.

Still concerned over his representation in court, he appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals with a new court-appointed lawyer. In addition to the complaints about counsel, the appeal claimed that the district court had violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(2). The rule requires each judge to remind the defendant that he or she cannot withdraw a guilty plea if a plea agreement falls through in court. The district judge had made "vague reference" to the rule, but failed to read it "word for word," according to Myra Mossman, Benitez's attorney, who calls this a failure of the system.

"It's embarrassing, but it happens," Mossman says. "[Courts] get convictions, and they are falsely confessing."

Dozens of appeals court cases before Benitez's have struggled with the technicalities of Rule 11. A number of courts have said that a mistake in its application must be such that the defendant can prove he or she would not have plead guilty if it had not been made. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue in U.S. v. Vonn, holding that a violation of Rule 11 is a plain error as opposed to a harmless one, and that the whole court record should be examined to determine if that error exists.

Mossman says the language barrier in particular makes this case too far from the precedent to be bound by it. "[Benitez] had no incentive to read [his plea agreement] because his plea agreement was in English. He never heard anything. Vonn at least was given some warning," she says.

A divided 9th Circuit panel agreed, reversing and remanding Benitezs conviction. Though the Supreme Court had said in Vonn that the plain error rule requires a consideration of the whole court proceedings, Judges James Browning and Stephen Reinhardt disagreed. Examining only the questions regarding Rule 11 (and not inadequate counsel), their majority opinion, written by Browning, created a new standard of review—a four-prong test on error.

Browning wrote that the extreme difference between "the boiler plate language in the agreement and being advised of a fact in open court" made the judge's omission of 11(2)(e) an error, and moreover, a "plain error," not a technical blip. Further, the majority said this error affected "substantial rights," and finally, that it constituted a "miscarriage of the justice system," affecting its integrity as a judicial body.

"The 9th circuit is asking if the defendant actually knew what was going on," Mossman says.

Judge Richard Tallman dissented, finding that no plain error existed, considering that the agreement was not hastily prepared and trial judge had it translated into Spanish. "In light of Vonn, I see no reason why we must cast a blind eye to the contents of the written plea agreement specifically reviewed by Judge Stotler with Benitez in the courtroom," Tallman wrote.

In seeking review from the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Solicitor General argued that the 9th Circuit's departure from the Vonn precedent is unnecessary and unacceptable.

"The court of appeals decision squarely conflicts with decisions of nine other courts of appeals, including the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuit decisions that respondent singles out for special attention," the governments reply brief to the Supreme Court adds.

With Benitez still in prison, the Supreme Court, on Dec. 8, 2003, agreed hear his case, limiting review to the question noted above.