Blakely, Ralph v. Washington (06/24/2004)

Questions presented: Whether a fact (other than a prior conviction) necessary for an upward departure from a statutory standard sentencing range must be proved according to the procedures mandated by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

BY LAUREN SPUHLER and JACK C. DOPPELT, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

Ralph Howard Blakely Jr. kidnapped his estranged wife, Yolanda, from their home in Grant County, Wash., in October of 1998.

Armed with a knife, he wrapped his wifes head in duct tape and bound her wrists. He then dragged her to a homemade coffin in the bed of his pickup truck and threatened that she would bleed to death inside.

When his 13-year-old son, Ralphy, came home from school, Blakely ordered him to follow in another car as he drove to family property in Montana. Blakely told his son he had a gun and would blow a hole through him or the coffin if the teen "tried anything." Ralphy escaped at a gas station, and Blakely continued to Montana with his wife.

Yolanda rode in either the coffin or the passenger seat on the trip. Blakely told his wife he wanted her to drop her plans for divorce and termination of the familys.

Blakely was arrested in Montana the next day when he stopped to see a friend who secretly alerted the police.

After federal charges against Blakely were dropped, the state of Washington filed two charges of first degree kidnapping involving violence. Blakely pleaded not guilty and claimed insanity.

The Superior Court of Washington for Grant County agreed to hear a plea agreement on July 18, 2000.

As part of a plea bargain, Blakely would confess guilt for the second degree kidnapping of his wife with a deadly weapon and second degree domestic violence assault of his son.

The judge warned Blakely that he would face a lengthy prison sentence. Washington uses a guideline system to determine sentences. The facts of a crime are entered into the system, which produces a range of months that should be served depending on the nature of the crime.

The guideline system produced 53 months as the suggestion for Blakely's crimes, even though the statutory maximum was 10 years. The judge and lawyers agreed that Blakely understood the sentencing he faced with a guilty plea.

Two weeks later, Blakely tried to withdraw his guilty plea at the sentencing hearing. The judge denied that attempt and finalized Blakely's 90-month sentence. The judge added an extra 37 months to the guideline of 53 after learning just prior to the sentencing that deliberate cruelty and violence were added factors in the crime.

Blakely appealed, claiming that the hefty sentence violated the 2000 Supreme Court opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, that held that only a jury may increase a sentence if evidence presented proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Blakely's attorney's also said the trial judge based his sentence on "a preponderance of evidence," a lower burden of proof.

A Washington Court of Appeals panel reviewed whether the state's sentencing guidelines violated Apprendi by permitting the sentencing judge to depart from guideline ranges even though the sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum.

In rejecting Blakely's arguments, the appeals court unanimously found that judges, as well as juries, can review "aggravating factors," concluding that Washington law "permits a judge to impose an exceptional sentence within the maximum range determined by the Legislature.

"We will not disturb the trial courts discretion unless we find that no reasonable judge would have imposed the same sentence," Judge John Schultheis wrote for the panel.

The Washington Supreme Court denied review in February 2003.

On Oct. 20, 2003, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

In a "friend of the court" role, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers said the Washington courts were wrong in letting the judge increase Blakelys sentencing. The organization added that allowing such action threatens to leave the Supreme Courts view on jury roles meaningless.

Jeff Fisher, Blakelys lawyer, added that he hopes the Court rules against hearing aggravating factors just before sentencing.

"If we prevail, it will cause Washington and other states to change the way aggravating facts are found in sentencing procedures," Fisher said.

Prosecutor Teresa Chen said Blakelys crime was not a typical crime and completely warranted a longer sentence than prescribed by Washington's sentencing guidelines.

"Never do you need to put a person in a coffin to make a person go with you," Chen said. She also explained that the effect on Blakely's son Ralphy is enough reason to increase his sentence.

On June 24, 2004, a fiercely divided Court, reversed, holding for Blakely that because the facts supporting his exceptional sentence were neither admitted by him nor found by a jury, the sentence violated his 6th Amendment right to trial by jury.

Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia applied the Court's 2000 opinion in Apprendi to dictate the result. The relevant statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum a judge may impose based solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant, Scalia reasoned. Regardless of whether the judge’s authority to impose the enhanced sentence depended on a judge’s finding a specified fact, one of several specified facts, or any aggravating fact, it remained the case that the jury’s verdict alone did not authorize the sentence.

Noting that Blakely was sentenced to prison for more than three years beyond what the law allowed for the crime to which he confessed, Scalia concluded that the "framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, before depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the State should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to 'the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours,' rather than a lone employee of the State [the judge]."

Three separate dissents were penned, each alarmist, regarding the consequences of the majority opinion.

Justice Sandra Day O' Connor charged that the legacy of the opinion, "whether intended or not, will be the consolidation of sentencing power in the State and Federal Judiciaries. The Court says to Congress and state legislatures: If you want to constrain the sentencing discretion of judges and bring some uniformity to sentencing, it will cost you–dearly. Congress and States, faced with the burdens imposed by the extension of Apprendi to the present context, will either trim or eliminate altogether their sentencing guidelines schemes and, with them, 20 years of sentencing reform. It is thus of little moment that the majority does not expressly declare guidelines schemes unconstitutional."

Justice Anthony Kennedy agreed and added that the majority was overlooking "the dynamic and fruitful dialogue between the judicial and legislative branches of government that has marked sentencing reform on both the state and the federal levels for more than 20 years."

Even more blunt and shocked was Justice Stephen Breyer:

"Taken together these three sets of considerations, concerning consequences, concerning history, concerning institutional reliance, leave me where I was in Apprendi, i.e., convinced that the Court is wrong. Until now, I would have thought the Court might have limited Apprendi so that its underlying principle would not undo sentencing reform efforts. Today’s case dispels that illusion. At a minimum, the case sets aside numerous state efforts in that direction. Perhaps the Court will distinguish the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but I am uncertain how. As a result of today’s decision, federal prosecutors, like state prosecutors, must decide what to do next, how to handle tomorrow’s case."

Breyer also argued that beyond the consequence to the judicial system, the opinion also works against criminal defendants by depriving them of the opportunity to argue sentencing factors to a judge.

Chief Justice William Rehnquist was the 4th dissenter in the case.