Clay, Erick v. U.S. (03/04/2003)

Questions presented: Whether petitioner's judgment of conviction became "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2255 para. 6(1) one year after the court of appeals issued its mandate on direct appeal or one year after his time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari expired?

BY CHARLIE FRAGO, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

During the summer of 1996, Erick Cornell Clay began selling crack cocaine to a woman who lived in a rented room in a house in South Bend, Indiana. In an apparent effort to settle the drug debt the woman owed him, Clay set the residence on fire, damaging the house and killing a dog and cat.

In December of 1997, Clay was convicted in a federal court in Indiana of arson and distributing crack cocaine, and sentenced to more than 11 years in prison, to be followed by three years of supervised release. About a year later, on Nov. 23, 1998 the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished order, and on Dec. 15, issued its mandate.

It was not until Feb. 22, 2000, slightly more than one year later, that Clay, acting pro se, filed a habeas corpus motion challenging his sentence. He argued that the indictment under which he was convicted failed to include the required mental state for arson and that his trial counsel was ineffective. About two months later, Clay moved to amend his petition to add claims that his sentence violated the 5th Amendments Ex Post Facto Clause of the 5th Amendment and that his ineffective lawyer had failed to advise him fully about a plea offer made by the government before trial.

On June 21, 2000, the district court asked the parties to show cause why Clays petition shouldnt be dismissed as untimely in that his petition was filed more than one year after the date on which his judgment of conviction becomes final, the triggering date being when the court of appeals issued the mandate in his direct appeal.

The government argued that Clays petition should in fact be dismissed, but disagreed with how the 7th Circuit's interprets timeliness under the federal habeas corpus statute. The government argued that the triggering date for when a conviction becomes final is the day the time allowed for certiorari review by the Supreme Court expires.

On Aug. 2, 2000, the district court denied Clays habeas petition, ruling that "when a federal prisoner in this circuit does not seek certiorari ... the conviction becomes 'final' on the date the appellate court issues the mandate in the direct appeal."

On Jan. 25, 2002, a unanimous 7th Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed in an unpublished opinion, agreeing with the district court's conclusion that Clays motion was untimely, though conceding that its date for finality represents the minority view. In its opinion, the 7th Circuit referred to its own precedent from a 1998 case. In that case, the court pointed out that there was no explicit language about time limits for federal prisoners in the 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which set a one-year time limit for prisoners to make habeas motions. Since the 1996 law lacks any explicit language granting federal prisoners the additional 90-day period after an appeals court mandate, the 7th Circuit reasoned that Congress must have intended that federal prisoners be treated differently than state prisoners. State prisoners do enjoy the explicit right to the 90-day period under a different section of the same federal statute.

In Clays case, the 7th Circuit declined to revisit the issue, saying that it would not overturn "a recently-reaffirmed precedent without guidance from the Supreme Court."

Clay, this time represented by counsel, sought U.S. Supreme Court review to clarify for federal prisoners when a conviction becomes final.

The basic question is this: Can federal prisoners file habeas corpus motions after the one-year anniversary of a court of appeal mandated conviction? Or does that right run out after an additional 90-day period in which they could appeal to the Supreme Court for a review of their case?

The 7th and 4th circuits hold that "final" means one year after the prisoners conviction is mandated or the formal date when a reviewing court notifies the lower court of its judgment.

Six other federal courts of appeal (1st, 3rd, 5th, 9th, 10th, and 11th), the U.S. Solicitor General and Clays attorneys disagree: they say that federal prisoners should have the extra 90 days to file a motion for the Supreme Court to hear their case.

In 2001 alone, federal prisoners filed 8,644 habeas corpus motions to vacate their sentences, according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. That number suggests the importance of resolving the divide between appeals courts, said Jonathan Kravis, an attorney with Goldstein and Howe, the Washington, D.C. firm representing Clay, who continues to serve his sentence in a federal prison in Tennessee.

"There is a real danger of a federal prisoner being sentenced in one circuit, imprisoned in another and becoming confused. They look up their rights in the law library and think they have enough time," said Kravis.

Though Clay's attorneys and the Solicitor General agree that the federal statute should be interpreted to extend the 90-day period to federal prisoners, they differ, however, on whether Clay is an appropriate case to reconcile the appeals court dispute.

The Solicitor General argues that Clay is not inappropriate because his underlying basis for appeal -- ineffective counsel at his trial -- "lacks merit" so Clay "would not be entitled to relief however this Court resolved" the dispute.

Clays attorneys respond that his case is a perfect vehicle to resolve the existing 6-2 court of appeals split because Clays habeas corpus time limit was the only issue the 7th Circuit examined.

That the different courts of appeals are in dispute is "a hot point of contention, said Kravis.

On June 28, 2002, the final day of the Supreme Court's 2001-02 term, the Court accepted the case for review, and limited the review to the question mentioned above.

On March 4, 2003, the Court unanimously sided with Clay. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the Court opinion, which held that for the purpose of starting the clock on 2255s one-year limitation period, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate courts affirmation of the conviction.