U.S. v. Ruiz, Angela (06/24/2002)

By: Jeff Yoders, Medill News Service

Questions presented

Whether before pleading guilty, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to obtain exculpatory information, including impeachment material, from the government, and if so, whether that right may be waived through a plea agreement?

Brief

On Aug. 13, 1999, Angela Ruiz was stopped at the Mexican border with more than 66 pounds of marijuana in her car. That day she set into motion a chain of events that has the U.S. Supreme Court questioning the way federal prosecutors in all 50 states negotiate guilty pleas.

Ruiz, who has lived most of her life in San Diego, was crossing the border at San Ysidro back into California. When border police found the marijuana in her trunk, she became one of the thousands of people to be arrested for importing narcotics across the border annually. So common was her offense that they not only clogged the docket in the U.S. District Court for Southern California but the sheer volume of drug cases led federal judges and prosecutors in San Diego to agree on a ""fast track"" policy to expedite guilty plea agreements. This fast track program rewarded defendants who agreed to waive several rights, including the right to an indictment, very early in the pre-trial process for saving the government the time and money it would take to go to trial.

One of the many benefits a defendant received in the program was a two-level ""downward departure"" from the federal sentencing guideline range. In Ruizs case, the two-level departure from the applicable sentencing range would have meant a change from a maximum two years in prison to a maximum of a year and six months. That is, if shed agreed to it.

Ruiz refused to give up her rights, specifically her right to impeachment evidence, the kind of evidence that proves a government witness is lying or did not follow proper procedures. Although the 1970 decision in Brady v. U.S. is widely known as a case that guarantees someone standing trial access to exculpatory evidence, the kind that proves you innocent, Brady also guarantees a criminal defendant a right to impeachment evidence.

When Ruiz pleaded guilty without an agreement, she and her attorney argued that shed complied with all the parameters of the agreement (not filing motions) except the one about waiving what they considered constitutionally-guaranteed Brady rights. Federal prosecutors refused to recommend the downward departure. Under the fast-track policy, the recommendation of the prosecutor is extremely important because the ""policy"" is not law but rather an agreement to follow a recommendation between a judge and a prosecutor. Ruiz ended up with a sentence of 18 months in federal prison. She could have received as little as a year.

Despite her guilty plea, Ruiz appealed. Her attorney, Troy Britt, argued she could still appeal because the plea agreement she was offered was unconstitutional, since it ""denied her due process of the law, guaranteed by the constitution."" The due process violation was in not granting impeachment evidence to the defense so Ruiz could make an ""intelligent and voluntary"" decision about her plea.

On March 5, 2001 a divided 9th Circuit Court of Appeals panel agreed.

""The due process right to receive undisclosed Brady material cannot be waived without offending another due process requirement, namely, that plea agreements be entered voluntarily and intelligently,"" wrote Judge Robert Boochever for the majority.

Judge A. Wallace Tashima concurred and added that the judges refusal to grant a two-level downward departure because of the lack of a plea agreement was also improper because the fast track policy is not a part of federal law.

""Thus if such a departure were granted in a case in which the prosecution was opposed to it, the prosecution could conceivably appeal the departure, and would have strong ground to argue for a reversal,"" Tashima wrote.

Dissenting, Judge Richard C. Tallman argued that the appeals court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of a trial judges sentence and could only rule on a direct challenge to a plea agreement. If the government were required to release information on informants under Brady it could jeopardize undercover FBI agents and other operatives, he reasoned. He also noted that requiring Brady material to be turned over prior to plea agreements would jeopardize the fast track program in Southern California. The weighted caseload per active judgeship in the Southern District of California is more than twice the average caseload of all districts in the 9th Circuit.

In petitioning for Supreme Court review, the U.S. Solicitor General argued that exculpatory information, including impeachment material, is only necessary after a trial has become apparent.

""The criminal justice system has a pressing need for this courts intervention to resolve the questions whether a defendant has a right to obtain Brady material before pleading guilty and, if so, whether that right may be waived,"" the petition reads. ""Approximately 95 percent of federal convictions are obtained by guilty plea and approximately 85 percent of all criminal defendants in the federal system have their cases resolved through guilty pleas. The questions in this case are therefore ones of recurring importance to federal prosecutors throughout the country.""

Steven Hubachek, the federal defender who represents Ruiz, believes the governments argument about jeopardizing plea bargain agreements is bogus.

""The idea that turning over this information before a plea would cause a backup in courtrooms is utterly baseless,"" Hubachek said. ""The Southern District of California is one of the two busiest courts in the nation and since Ruiz was handed down (by the 9th Circuit), it has not hindered at all the rate of plea bargains.""

But the governments petition to the high court also includes language from the 1970 Brady ruling itself. That section of the Brady ruling states: ""We find no requirement in the constitution that a defendant must be permitted to disown his solemn admissions in open court that he committed the act with which he is charged simply because it later develops that the state would have had a weaker case than the defendant had thought.""

Hubachek claims this language does not apply to Ruizs plea because the Brady ruling, and other Supreme Court decisions the government cites, is in reference to admissions in trials, not plea agreements.

""The 9th Circuit ruled with us and the vast majority of lower courts have ruled with us,"" Hubachek said. ""Im not in the least bit concerned about that language because the Supreme Court has never really ruled on something like this, a disagreement about evidence at the plea stage.""

On Jan. 4, 2002 the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, and on June 24, the Court, by a vote of 9-0, held that prosecutors don't have to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a defendant.

Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the lead opinion for the Court, with Justice Clarence Thomas adding a concurrence.