U.S. v. Knights, Mark (12/10/2001)

Questions presented: Does a defendant's agreement to a term of probation that authorized any law enforcement officer to search his person or premises with or without warrant, and with or without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, constitute valid consent to a search by a law enforcement officer investigating crimes?

BY JOHN HALLORAN, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

Mark James Knights was convicted of a misdemeanor drug possession charge in 1998.

He was sentenced to probation, and as a condition of probation, he agreed to "submit his person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer," thus, substantially limiting his 4th Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure.

At about the same time, Knights, along with his friend, Steven Simoneau, were the focus of an investigation of more than 30 incidences of vandalism to California's Pacific Gas and Electric Company's facilities in Napa County dating back to 1996.

Suspicion focused on Knights because the vandalism started about the time his power was cut off in 1996, and in May 1998, Knights and Simoneau were stopped by a sheriff's deputy near a PG&E gas line. Upon observing pipes, pieces of chain, tools, and gasoline in Simoneau's pick-up truck, the deputy asked to search the vehicle, but was refused permission.

On the morning of June 1, 1998, brass padlocks that secured a PG&E power transformer and a Pacific Bell telecommunications vault were removed and gasoline was used to start a fire in the vault, destroying the phone lines and knocking out telephone service to the Napa County Airport.

A deputy saw Simoneau's truck parked outside Knights' apartment a short time after the fire. He got out of his patrol car and felt that the hood of the truck was still warm, which suggested that Knights and Simoneau might have been involved in the vandalism.

In the early morning of June 3, police set up surveillance of Knights' apartment, located across the street of the Napa River. After observing Simoneau come out of the apartment at about 3:10 a.m., carrying three cylindrical items, which appeared to deputies to possibly be pipe bombs, and seeing a Molotov cocktail and explosives material in plain view in Simoneau's truck, an officer decided to execute a warrantless "probation" search of Knights' apartment.

The search was conducted later in the morning, while Knights was still in bed. The officers broke through a door and entered the apartment, discovering detonation cord, ammunition, unidentified liquid chemicals, instruction manuals on chemistry, bolt cutters, telephone pole climbing spurs, photographs and blueprints stolen from a burglarized building, a brass padlock stamped PG&E, and drug paraphernalia.

Knights was arrested, and later indicted, in part based on the evidence from the search, for conspiracy to commit arson, possession of an unregistered destructive device, and for being a felon in possession of ammunition.

Knights moved to suppress the evidence obtained June 3. The district court threw out the evidence, finding that the claimed probation search was really a subterfuge for an investigative search.

On Aug. 3, 2000, a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals panel in San Francisco unanimously affirmed, holding that even when a person consents to searches of his home as a condition of probation, "those searches must be conducted for probation purposes and not as a mere subterfuge for the pursuit of criminal investigations."

The opinion written by Judge Ferdinand Fernandez waxed eloquent about the balance between privacy and the needs of law enforcement. Calling it "sempiternal," meaning eternal, and digging back to 1603 for historical precedent, Fernandez stated that "the balance is weighted in favor of the home dweller for reasons with a weighty ancient lineage."

In defending Knights' right to privacy, Fernandez also lamented the daily transgressions in contemporary society:

"As we enter the 21st Century, citizens find the very notion of privacy under almost relentless assault. Random suspiciousness taking and testing of body fluids proliferates on ever more flimsy grounds; motor vehicle departments sell information about those who are forced to give it in order to obtain driver's licenses; banks use private account informa-tion for other purposes and provide it to other related entities; when a consumer visits a website, a spy is placed in his computer; it has become easier to invade homes without knocking and giving notice; and on and on," wrote Fernandez. "In this climate, it is easy to develop callouses on our sense of privacy. Perhaps it even seems quaint to worry much about the sanctity of a home where we can speak, listen, read, write and think in privacy."

Having expressed his concerns, Fernandez wrote that 9th Circuit's holdings have consistently made it clear that consents such as the one Knights gave "must be seen as limited to probation searches, and must stop short of investigation searches."

Law enforcement in the case "were not a bit interested in Knights' rehabilitation" while on probation, Fernandez wrote, but were intent on "the termination of his nefarious career."

"True, a probation officer may also wish to end wrongdoing by a probationer, but there was no 'also' about [the detective's] purpose," Fernandez wrote. "The subterfuge will not work."

In so concluding, Fernandez recognized that had the search been done by local or state officers in California, rather than federal agents under federal law, the courts might have been more sympathetic to the search.

"Perhaps the California courts will admit the fruits of the search of Knights' residence; we will not," the appeals court opinion stated.

"We can, instead, rely upon the wisdom of the ages and upon the sagacity of the numerous Ninth Circuit judges who have written before us. If we do not heed all of that history and learning, who will?" Fernandez asked.

On May 14, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, allowed Knights to proceed in forma pauperis, and allowed the Rutherford Institute to participate as amicus.

On Dec. 10, 2001, a unanimous Court reversed, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, holding that the warrantless search did not violate Knight's 4th Amendment rights.