Alabama v. Shelton, LeReed (05/20/2002)

Questions presented: In light of the "actual imprisonment" standard established in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), and refined in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), does the imposition of a suspended or conditional sentence in a misdemeanor case invoke a defendant's 6th Amendment right to counsel?

BY MIKE CUMMINGS, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

LeReed Shelton was charged with third degree assault after a confrontation he had with an individual arising from a car accident.

An Alabama district court convicted Shelton and ordered him to pay a $500 fine and $333.75 as restitution to the victim. Shelton appealed his conviction to the circuit court, where he represented himself at a jury trial.

The jury also found him guilty of third degree assault, but this time, the judge imposed a sentence of 30 days' imprisonment, a $500 fine, $516.69 as restitution to the victim and court costs. The court suspended Sheltons prison sentence and placed him on probation.

Shelton appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which held that he had a Constitutional right to legal counsel because he had received a suspended prison sentence and remanded the case to the trial court to decide if Shelton had knowingly and voluntarily waived that right.

At a hearing Shelton testified that he was not informed of the possibility that he could serve jail time if convicted and that he was not aware that the court would appoint him a lawyer if he could not pay for one himself. The record showed that no one had directly informed him that the court would appoint him a lawyer if he could not afford one.

The judge ruled that though Shelton never overtly waived his right to counsel, "he was aware of his right to employ counsel and in fact did a creditable job of defending his own case."

On return from remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals cited two U.S. Supreme Court cases. The first, Argersinger v. Hamlin, established in 1972 the rule that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by legal counsel at his trial."

In the second case, Scott v. Illinois, the Court seven years later ruled that defendants who receive fine, but no prison sentence, are not entitled to appointed legal counsel.

Since Shelton's sentence was suspended, and he did not serve prison time, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that under Scott v. Illinois, he did not have the right to a court appointed attorney, and upheld his conviction.

In a 6-1 ruling, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld Sheltons conviction, but reversed the 30-day suspended sentence.

In the majority opinion, Justice Doug Johnstone stated: "[W]e hold that the defendant in this case was entitled to representation by counsel because he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, albeit suspended. We do not conclude that a defendant convicted of a petty or misdemeanor offense can establish a violation of his right to counsel when the defendant has not been sentenced to a term of imprisonment."

Johnstone noted in his opinion the conflicting precedent established by federal and state courts in regard to whether a defendant who receives a suspended sentence has the right to appointed counsel.

Alabama's Attorney General noted the problems caused by this confusing precedent in his petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.

"Inconsistencies in the Scott interpretations among federal circuit courts and state supreme courts lead to disparate results and inequitable treatment of defendants based solely on the jurisdiction where the misdemeanor occurs," he wrote.

Shelton's attorney William Mills agrees that the Supreme Court needs to establish a solid precedent regarding suspended sentences and right to counsel.

"The court has ruled that people must be informed of their right to counsel when theyve received a prison sentence, but not when they receive a fine," he said. "This is a gray area."

On May 14, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case.

On Oct. 1, the Court granted to Texas et al. permission to participate in the case and split the time for oral argument.

On Oct. 18, less than three weeks before the case was scheduled for oral argument, the Court removed the case from its argument calendar, and invited attorney Charles Fried to file a brief, and to argue, as friend of the court, the following position: where counsel is not afforded to an indigent defendant, the U.S. Constitution does not bar the imposition of a suspended or probationary sentence upon conviction of a misdemeanor, even though the defendant might be incarcerated in the event probation is revoked.

On May 20, 2002, the Court, divided along ideological lines, held 5-4 that a suspended sentence that may "end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty" may not be imposed unless the defendant was provided an attorney at trial. The split in the Court was over whether the prospect of imprisonment down the road was sufficient to trigger a defendant's right to counsel.

The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concluded that the time to ensure effective counsel is at trial, and rejected the claim by the amicus that such a constitutional interpretation would "substantially limit the states ability" to impose probation.

"All but 16 States, for example, would provide counsel to a defendant in Sheltons circumstances, either because he received a substantial fine or because state law authorized incarceration for the charged offense or provided for a maximum prison term of one year," wrote Ginsburg. "There is thus scant reason to believe that a rule conditioning imposition of a suspended sentence on provision of appointed counsel would affect existing practice in the large majority of the States. And given the current commitment of most jurisdictions to affording court-appointed counsel to indigent misdemeanants while simultaneously preserving the option of probationary punishment, we do not share amicus concern that other States may lack the capacity and resources to do the same."

In a terse 7-paragraph dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia criticized the majority for ignoring precedent and extending the misdemeanor right to counsel to cases bearing the "mere threat" of imprisonment.

"Today's imposition upon the States finds justification neither in the text of the Constitution, nor in the settled practices of our people, nor in the prior jurisprudence of this Court," concluded Scalia for himself, Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice William Rehnquist.