Tyler, Melvin v. Cain, Warden (06/28/2001)

By: Elyssa Andrus, Medill News Service

Questions presented

Can Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), which held certain jury instructions concerning reasonable doubt unconstitutional, be applied retroactively on collateral review?

Brief

In 1975, Melvin Tyler was drunk, angry and armed. Following a fight, the Louisiana resident fired several shots into his girlfriends bedroom window. One of the bullets ricocheted off the wall, killing Tylers 19-day-old daughter.

According to his attorney, Tyler had only meant to scare his girlfriend with the gunshots. He never intended to kill his infant daughter.

A year later, a jury convicted Tyler of second-degree murder, following instructions from the judge that a reasonable doubt must ""give rise to grave uncertainty"" and be one for which a juror could ""give good reason."" Tyler was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Fourteen years later, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a separate case, Cage v. Louisiana, that an inmate be allowed a new trial because the definition of ""reasonable doubt"" used at his trial was unconstitutional.

In that 1990 opinion, the Supreme Court said that jury instructions mandating that reasonable doubt ""give rise to grave uncertainty"" and be based on ""an actual substantial doubt"" violated the 14th Amendments due process clause.

In 1996, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which greatly limits a prisoners right to appeal. Under AEDPA, a petitioner seeking federal habeas relief must show that the state courts decision was ""contrary to É clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.""

A year later, following denial at the state level, Tyler filed a federal habeas petition, seeking a new trial and claiming his jury received instructions similar to those used in Cage.

Tyler argued that the ""good reason"" clause, combined with other errors, significantly lowered the standard of proof demanded by due process.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed Tylers petition, ruling that, under strict AEDPA standards, Cage v. Louisiana could not be applied retroactively. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.

On Dec. 11, 2000, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, allowing Tyler to proceed in forma pauaperis.

Attorney Herbert Larson, who is representing Tyler pro bono before the Supreme Court, said he is asking the Court to focus specifically on whether Cage can be applied retroactively.

Larson believes Tyler would have been convicted of a lesser offense if the jury had been ""properly instructed.""

""I think that at worst [Tyler] would have been convicted of manslaughter and more probably negligent homicide. Under the facts of the case, it was clear that he did not have the intent to shoot the child. It was his own child,"" Larson said.

On March 26, 2001, the Court allowed the Acting U.S. Solicitor General to file an amicus brief supporting Cain and the state of Louisiana and to split the time for oral argument.

On June 28, 2001, the final day of the Court's 2000-01 term, the Court held 5-4 that Louisiana's jury instruction on ""reasonable doubt"" need not be applied retroactively.