Norfolk Southern Railway v. Shanklin, Dedra (04/17/2000)

Questions presented: Did the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals properly apply CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993), when it held, in acknowledged conflict with the decisions of three other circuits, that claims of negligence based on inadequate warning devices at railway grade crossing are not preempted even though warning devices at crossing were installed with federal funds under a project approved by federal government?

BY CHRIS SEWELL, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

On Oct. 3, 1993, Eddie Shanklin was struck and killed by one of Norfolk Southern Railways trains as he drove his car east across the Oakwood Church Road Crossing in Gibson County, Tenn. Shanklins widow, Dedra Shanklin, brought five separate claims of negligence against Norfolk Southern for the accident.

Shanklins claims were based on both common law and Tennessee statutes. In response, Norfolk Southern moved for summary judgment, suggesting that Shanklins state law claims were preempted by the Federal Railroad Safety and Highway Safety Acts.

Congress enacted the FRSA in 1970 to enforce nationally uniform safety practices authorized by the Secretary of Transportation. When a railroad company meets nationally standardized safety regulations, preemption from accidents like Shanklins may occur.

In addition to the FRSA, the Highway Safety Act of 1973 provided federal funds to states needing improved highways and railway crossings. To qualify for federal funding, states must identify those highways and crossings requiring safety improvements and must "establish and implement a schedule of projects for this purpose."

The district court granted Norfolk Southerns motion for summary judgment in April 1996, but for only two of the five claims. Summary judgment for the remaining three claims was denied and the case went to trial.

The jury found both Norfolk Southern and Mr. Shanklin negligent in the accident, placing 30 percent of the negligence upon Shanklin and the remaining 70 percent upon Norfolk Southern. The jury also concluded that total damages amounted to $615,379. Based on the jurys decision that Norfolk Southern should bear 70 percent of the blame, the district court awarded Shanklin $430,765.30.

In 1993, the Supreme Court addressed the preemption issue in CSX Transportation v. Easterwood. The Court held that federally funded installation of "adequate warning devices" at railway crossings preempted state law claims against rail companies alleging inadequacy of those devices.

In December 1989, the Tennessee Department of Transportation received federal funds for a project that included installation of warning devices at the Oakwood Church Road Crossing, the site of Shanklins accident. A Federal Highway Safety Act engineer inspected samples of area crossings needing improvement. Although the Oakwood Church Road Crossing was included in the approved project, it was never specifically tapped for improvement.

Citing the Easterwood opinion, Norfolk Southern contended that the existence of federal funding preempted Shanklins state law claims under both the Federal Railroad Safety and Highway Safety Acts.

Despite the clarity of the Supreme Courts Easterwood decision, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district courts judgment. The 6th Circuit's ruling, which distinguished the Supreme Courts Easterwood opinion, agreed with the 7th Circuits 1994 opinion in Shots v. CSX Transportation.

The 5th, 8th and 10th Circuit Courts of Appeals have all remained true to the Easterwood opinion, but the 7th, and now the 6th Circuit Courts of Appeals have strayed from a "literal reading" of the decision. Both the 6th and 7th Circuits based opinions not on the mere presence of federal funding, but on whether or not federal officials complied with regulations in improvement projects.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on Oct. 18, 1999.

On April 17, 2000, the Court reversed, holding 7-2 that the existence of federal funding for the installation of warning devices at crossings preempted Shanklins personal injury claims under both the Federal Railroad Safety and Highway Safety Acts.

Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said the case could not be distinguished from the Court's 1993 decision in Easterwood. Once the Federal Highway Administration approves and funds the devices, federal regulation displaces state and private decisionmaking authority. Whether the state should have originally installed different or additional devices, or whether conditions at the crossing have since changed such that different devices would be appropriate, is immaterial, the majority held.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg penned a dissent, in which Justice John Paul Stevens joined. "The upshot of the Courts decision is that state negligence law is displaced with no substantive federal standard of conduct to fill thevoid," the dissent criticized. "That outcome defies common sense and sound policy."