Francois Holloway (a.k.a. Abu Ali) v. United States of America (03/02/1999)

By: Riza Freeman, Medill News Service

Questions presented

Whether a defendant acted ""with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm"" for purposes of the federal carjacking statute, 18 USC 2119, where he intended to cause death or serious harm if it proved necessary to do so in order to steal the victim's car.

Brief

The case formally known as U.S. v. Holloway is reminiscent of a Dostoyevskian novel. The question arises if anyone, including a federal court, ever truly knows what evil lurks in the heart of man? That is, can they know of his intent to commit a crime? According to two judges, yes, they can.

Francois Holloway, a.k.a. Abu Ali, carried out a series of carjackings with his friend, Vernon Lennon, on the streets of Queens, New York in 1994. Lennon always held a .32 revolver to the victims, who would willingly surrender both their cars and their money. Although the two never used the gun, on one occasion, Holloway punched a man who was too slow in handing over his money. One victim testified that on another occasion, Holloway told her, ""Give me your keys or I will shoot you right now,"" after which the victim surrendered her keys and ran screaming into a nearby hair salon.

On February 2, 1995, Holloway was indicted on three counts of carjacking, three counts of using and carrying a firearm during the carjackings and two charges relating to the operation of a ""chop shop."" A jury trial was held in December 1995 in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Holloway was found guilty on all charges and sentenced by Judge John Gleeson to more than fifty years in prison and a ""special assessment"" of $400.

Holloway appealed, claiming that Judge Gleeson erred in his charge to the jury on the intent element of the carjacking statute, that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences on Holloway.

In a divided opinion, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held the trial court appropriately instructed the jury that an intent to kill or cause serious bodily harm conditioned on whether the victim relinquishes his or her car is sufficient to fulfill the intent requirement or the federal carjacking statute.

Under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, ""whoever with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle...from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation,"" shall be fined and/or imprisoned, if injury results, and possibly given the death sentence if death results.

The court agreed with the trial judge that had Holloway and Lennon been robbers who would merely threaten victims for their cars and flee the scene, the statute would not apply to them. But the court held it was sufficient intent under the statute to condition death or serious bodily harm on the victim's failure to comply with a carjacker's threats.

Holloway's attorney, Kevin J. Keating, disagreed. ""Conditional intent has never had a place in federal criminal practice and clearly is not encompassed by this specific intent statute,"" he said. ""Intent to cause death or serious physical serious injury means just that.""

The case has broad implications, Keating said. ""The overriding constitutional implication is that the courts cannot be permitted to create criminal statutes. That should be left to Congress.""

Francois Holloway's petition for certiorari was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court on April 27, 1998.

On March 2, 1999, the Court held 7-2 that the provision of the 1994 federal law does not require the prosecution to prove that the defendant had an unconditional intent to kill or harm in all events, but merely requires proof of an intent to kill or harm if necessary to effect a carjacking.Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion for the majority. Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas filed dissenting opinions.