Barnes, Kay, et al. v. Gorman, Jeffrey (06/17/2002)

By: Gregg Sherrard Blesch, Medill News Service

Questions presented

Did the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, in agreement with the 4th Circuit but in conflict with the 3rd and 6th Circuits, correctly hold that punitive damages may be awarded against a municipal government in an implied private cause of action brought under Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act or Section 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act?

Brief

Jeffrey Gorman rolled into ""Guitars and Cadillacs"" in his wheelchair on a Saturday night in May 1992. When he tried to roll onto the dance floor of the Kansas City, Mo., bar, a bouncer kicked him out.

Outside the club, when Gorman refused to leave, some off-duty police officers working security at the club arrested him for trespass and called for a police van.

A 1988 car wreck had left Gorman with no control of his lower torso and legs. He wears a catheter and bag for his urine, and he needs a special wheelchair to help him sit up.

In the back of the police van was a bench — no wheelchair locks. The security guards and the police officer driving the van lifted Gorman out of his chair onto the bench, ignoring his protests, according to Gorman. They strapped him in with a seatbelt, putting pressure on his urine bag, and used Gormans pants belt to strap his torso to the mesh behind the bench.

During the ride, Gorman couldnt stand the pressure on his urine bag anymore and released the seatbelt. Then the other belt came loose, and Gorman fell to the floor. His bag exploded, soaking him with urine.

The driver stopped but couldnt lift Gorman back onto the bench. He tied him to a support in the van for the rest of the trip.

After that ride, Gorman got a bladder infection and suffered back pain so bad that he needed surgery and was not able to work a full-time job. At the time, he was in his early 20s and just out of college, his lawyer John Simpson said. Gorman, who still lives in Kansas City, now sells dental supplies part time, Simpson said.

The first judge to consider Gormans complaint threw it out. Gorman had sued Kansas City's Board of Police Commissioners in federal court under Title V, section 504, of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II, section 202, of the Americans with Disabilities Act, both federal laws, and the judge didnt think a ride to jail was the kind of public program or service those laws targeted.

On appeal, Gormans complaint was remanded for trial. A jury awarded Gorman $1 million in actual damages and $1.2 million in punitive damages.

The Kansas City police officials appealed the punitive award.

The unanimous 8th Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, issued on June 13, 2001, focused on two arguments: whether a states 11th Amendment immunity from being sued in federal court extends to the Kansas City Police, and whether sections 504 and 202 provide for punitive damages.

On the first question, the court found that the Kansas City Police Board was not an arm of the state for the purposes of immunity because its function is local and any judgment against it would not be paid from state coffers.

But it was the argument about punitive damages that really troubled the appeals court — neither the Rehabilitation Act nor the ADA explicitly provides a cause of action or damages.

The court decided that controlling precedent allows punitive damages. But the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, the only other circuit court to address the question, came to the opposite conclusion.

Explaining the ruling in the 8th Circuit opinion, Judge C. Arlen Beam traversed a circuitous route through legal and legislative history.

Beam wrote that because sections 504 and 202 borrow their remedies from Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the court must determine what remedies are allowed under Title VI — which does not explicitly provide a private cause of action or any remedy.

The U.S. Supreme Court found an implied cause of action in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and ""relied heavily on the fact that Title IX had been modeled on Title VI,"" Beam wrote.

He continued: ""The Court assumed Congress knew that Title VI had been interpreted by some lower courts to contain an implied cause of action. Therefore, the Court concluded, Congress must have intended Title IX to similarly include an implied cause of action. This reading has since been turned around to conclude that Title VI must also contain an implied cause of action.""

Beam goes on to cite the Supreme Courts reasoning in 1992 in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools that Congress implicitly affirmed its intention of allowing the cause of action and damages when it amended the Title IX without excluding them. ""Once again indulging the assumption that Congress legislates in light of prevailing precedent, the Court found Congress to have intended the availability of all remedies.""

But Beam also wrote that his court made the decision ""not with great satisfaction.""

And he cried out for help: ""Perhaps our parting ways with our sister circuit will prompt the Supreme Court or Congress to inject additional clarity into this area.""

Although Beam seemed uncomfortable with the tangle of legal and legislative history navigated in the opinion, Simpson said the basis Beam laid out is clear. ""We think the 8th Circuit got it right,"" he said.

Some, including the National League of Cities, have expressed concern that a ruling in Gormans favor would leave municipalities vulnerable to devastating lawsuits. Simpson said it doesnt matter whether or not thats true: ""Congress, in our opinion, hasnt chosen to follow that line.""

On Jan. 11, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case.

In another ADA case, the Supreme Court in January 2002 narrowed the scope of the law in Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Ella Williams, finding that a womans carpal tunnel syndrome did not give her protection under the act because she was still able to ""perform the variety of tasks central to most peoples daily lives.""

On June 17, 2002, the Court held 9-0 that cities, boards and agencies that accept federal money aren't liable for punitive damages for accommodations violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act or the federal Rehabilitation Act.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the lead opinion in the case, with JusticesDavid Souter and John Paul Stevens adding brief concurring opinions.

Invoking principles of contract law, Scalia concluded that the scope of conduct for which funding recipients may be held liable in money damages does not include punitive damages because punitive damages are generally not available for breach of contract.

Stevens' concurrence, though brief, raised the specter of problems down the line brought on by a broader opinion than was necessary.

""[T]he Courts novel reliance on what has been, at most, a useful analogy to contract law has potentially far-reaching consequences that go well beyond the issues briefed and argued in this case,"" he wrote.

Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer agreed.