Georgia v. Randolph, Scott (03/22/2006)

Question presented: Can police search a home when a co-habitant consents and the other co-habitant is present and does not consent?

BY KATE ecKMAN & BLATHNAID HEALY, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

Husbands and wives have had disagreements since the beginning of time. Scott Randolph and his wife, Janet, are no exception. But their disagreement was so significant that it's found its way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

On July 6, 2001, Janet Randolph called police to report a domestic disturbance and asked them to come to the Americus, Ga., home she shared with her husband. The two had separated, but with Scott's consent she moved back into their home two days prior to the phone call.

When police arrived, she complained that Scott had taken away their son and had been using cocaine. Moments later, he returned home, telling police their son was at a neighbor's house.

Officers asked to search the couple's home. Scott objected. Janet consented, and led police to their bedroom where officers found cocaine – evidence later used to charge her husband with drug possession.

Janet later withdrew her consent, but it was too late. Police obtained a search warrant based on the cocaine they had discovered. They seized 25 drug-related items and charged Scott with drug possession.

A trial court in Georgia upheld the searches, but a Georgia appeals court reversed. Siding with Scott Randolph, the appellate court ruled that police must defer to an objecting occupant's position when two people have equal use and control of the home. According to the court, police cannot violate Scott's privacy rights, especially when a disgruntled wife consented over his objection.

On Nov. 8, 2004, the state Supreme Court affirmed, by a 4-3 vote, holding that in "a situation in which two persons have equal use and control of the premises to be searched, we conclude the consent to conduct a warrantless search of a residence given by one occupant is not valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant who is physically present at the scene to permit a warrantless search."

In so holding the majority distinguished the case from the 1974 U.S. Supreme Court opinion in U.S. v. Matlock, which permitted warrantless searches with the permission of a third party who possesses common authority over, or other sufficient relationship to, the premises sought to be inspected.

The court found that Scott objected to the search of his residence and filed a "motion to suppress evidence seized from his home in a warrantless search."

"The 4th Amendment [to the U.S. Constitution] generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person's home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects," wrote Justice Robert Benham for a divided Georgia Supreme Court. "While a co-inhabitant has authority to consent to a search of joint premises, a present, objecting party should not have his constitutional rights ignored due to a property interest shared with another."

Three justices dissented. Justice Carol Hunstein argued that the court should "embrace the principles recognized in Matlock to look not to the defendant's presence or absence but to whether or not he assumed the risk that the third party who possessed common authority over the premises would permit inspection in his own right." Therefore, "even though Randolph was present and objected, once Randolph's wife gave valid consent to the search of the home she shared with Randolph, that was sufficient to authorize the search."

Hunstein argued that a warrantless search without probable cause does not violate the 4th Amendment if the authorities have obtained the voluntary consent of a person authorized to grant such consent.

On April 18, 2005, the U. S. Supreme Court accepted review in the case.

The high court has previously said searches based on a cohabitant's consent are fine, but it is not clear whether that applies when another resident is present and objects. Lower courts are divided on the issue, with most holding that consent from one person is sufficient.

During the oral arguments, held on Nov. 8, 2005 the justices discussed when or if it would be appropriate for law enforcement to conduct a search without a warrant if the occupants of the premises are present and one gives consent to the search but the other objects.

Arguing that a person's right to privacy is lessened when they share a premises with another tenant, Paula K. Smith, Georgia senior assistant attorney general, said a person who satisfies the definition of common authority as demonstrated in Matlock is entitled to give consent to search an area of joint occupancy.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was dismissive of Smith. "Matlock doesn't speak to the two people who are in disagreement," she said.

Justice Antonin Scalia reinforced Justice Ginsburg's point, stating that the situation in Matlock was different because the other occupant was absent.

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Justice Anthony Kennedy both questioned what was socially acceptable between co-inhabitants. "Do you think it is the norm that, if there are co-inhabitants of a house or apartment, that it's okay to let a stranger in, against the express wishes of your spouse or co-habitant?" asked Justice O'Connor. Justice O'Connor encouraged the Court to examine "[the] social understanding on right to privacy."

Deputy U.S. Solicitor General Michael R. Dreeben's argument in support of Georgia stated that such disagreements generally occur "among couples in which there is some degree of tension and the spouse who consents in these situations has independent interest in ensuring that she can call upon the protection of the law."

In Randolph's case, Dreeben continued, his wife had a separate interest in disassociating herself from the alleged criminal activity, which was occurring at the premises they shared.

Justice Ginsburg argued that in this situation, the wife's accusation of her husband's cocaine use could have amounted to probable cause, which would have enabled the law enforcement present at the house to get a warrant, which would have removed the question of consent altogether. Justice John Paul Stevens reinforced the position of seeking a warrant to conduct the search instead of relying on the consent of the cotenant.

Chief Justice John Roberts weighed in, questioning the individual's right to privacy if that person shares a home with another person. "When you do live with someone else, you compromise your individual privacy interest to that extent," he said.

Justice Stephen Breyer expressed concern that a precedent of disallowing the consent of one occupant could be detrimental in an instance of spousal abuse.

"[If] she wants the policeman in. So, why does he have more right to keep the policeman out than she has to have the policeman in?" Justice Breyer asked.

Representing Randolph, Thomas C. Goldstein responded that a victim of spousal abuse is less likely to authorize a search of the premises.

Goldstein argued that the tension could be avoided if the police sought a telephonic warrant or had the materials brought out of the house to them. Responding to this, Justice Clarence Thomas said he saw no difference between whether the wife had brought the evidence outside of the home to show the police than if she had let them enter their house and search for it.