Gonzalez, Aurelia v. Crosby, Jr., James, Secy., Florida Dept. of Corrections (06/23/2005)

Question presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that every Rule 60(b) motion [other than for fraud under (b(3)] constitutes a prohibited "second or successive" petition as a matter of law?

BY GILLIAN KOENIG, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

In 1982, Aurelio Gonzalez pleaded guilty to armed robbery and was sentenced to 99 years in prison. He has spent the last 23 years in a Florida correctional facility.

More than a decade later, Gonzalez claimed his guilty plea was "unintelligent, unknowing and involuntary." He said his plea was induced by a false promise he would only serve 13 years of the 99-year sentence, and in November 1996, he filed a motion in state court challenging his conviction.

The state court denied relief. He appealed, but the appellate court affirmed.

So Gonzalez sought habeas relief in federal court.

State prisoners like Gonzalez can contest the validity of their convictions or sentences by filing federal habeas petitions. If the petition is successful, federal judges can reduce a prisoner's sentence, release them from custody or remand a case for retrial or resentencing.

In his habeas petition, Gonzalez attacked his conviction on grounds that he was sentenced based on an inaccurate criminal history, which included convictions of another man mistakenly thought to be him.

Gonzalez also alleged in the petition that the court interpreter told him he would receive the death penalty if he did not plead guilty. Gonzalez pleaded guilty because he was scared, said a Florida public defender close to the case. Furthermore, Gonzalez once again claimed he received false information regarding his sentence.

On Sept. 9, 1998, without any review of the merits of Gonzalez's case, the district court dismissed his petition as untimely, based on the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Gonzalez challenged the dismissal, but it was thrown out three months later.

The AEDPA, signed into law in 1996, limits the ability of state prisoners who have already filed habeas petitions in federal courts to file second or successive petitions. The Act also introduced a one year statute of limitations period for habeas petitions. Prior to the AEDPA, there was no statute of limitations regarding habeas petitions.

In 2001, in Artuz v Bennett, the U.S. Supreme Court corrected a lower court interpretation of how the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations should be calculated. The opinion determined that although the year begins to run when a state court action has been fully completed, how it starts and stops was more complicated.

The Artuz opinion provided Gonzalez with one last opportunity to challenge his conviction because the district court had denied his initial habeas petition as time barred.

Because the AEDPA prohibits filing a second habeas petition except in very narrow circumstances, Gonzalez filed a federal Rule 60(b) motion on July 30, 2001, seeking relief from judgment based on the change in law.

"[Rule] 60(b) is a safety valve if your appeals have run out," explained Amy Howe, an attorney with the Supreme Court litigation firm Goldstein & Howe P.C. in Washington D.C. "It's a way to go back to district court and reopen the district court order."

Howe, who filed an amicus brief on Gonzalez's behalf said, "Roughly one quarter of all the successful Rule 60(b) motions over the last nine years involve…an error concerning the statute of limitations to be applied to habeas petitions filed by prisoners convicted before the enactment of the AEDPA."

Still, the district court denied Gonzalez's Rule 60(b) motion to amend, and ruled that because Gonzalez had already brought an appeal to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court no longer has jurisdiction over his claims."

Once again, Gonzalez appealed, and this time the 11th circuit agreed to rehear the appeal en banc, consolidating his case with two otherwise unrelated habeas cases.

On April 26, 2004, more than seven years after Gonzalez filed his original habeas petition, the 11th Circuit ruled 7-4 that Gonzalez's Rule 60(b) motion was properly denied because the district court indeed lacked jurisdiction to hear it.

"Applying Rule 60(b) full throttle to final judgments in habeas cases would essentially repeal the later enacted AEDPA provisions restricting second or successive petitions," wrote Judge Edward E. Carnes for the majority.

The 11th circuit opinion said it would always consider a Rule 60(b) motion a prohibited second or successive motion if filed after an original habeas petition. The one exception was evidence of fraud in the court or a clerical error.

Carnes said the purpose of the AEDPA was to "ensure greater finality of state and federal court judgments in criminal cases" and to make certain "the merits of concluded criminal proceedings not be revisited in the absence of a strong showing of actual innocence."

However, Gonzalez's lawyers disagreed in their petition for Supreme Court review. "In this case, Rule 60(b) provides the final opportunity to vindicate Mr. Gonzalez's right to have his habeas claims heard on the merits," wrote attorney Paul Rashkind.

The petition further argued that "without the rule, his claims can never be addressed or determined, raising grave concerns of whether the statutory scheme, as interpreted in this case, suspends the Great Writ and violates due process of law."

For inmates like Gonzalez who face a life in prison, a federal Rule 60(b) is the only way by which they might obtain justice or receive a post-judgment correction, Howe said.

Currently seven circuits address the viability of Rule 60(b) motions on a flexible case-by-case basis, while three others, including the 11th circuit, maintain that the AEDPA "erects a bright line jurisdictional bar to Rule 60(b) motions in habeas corpus proceedings."

Federal defenders representing Gonzalez asked the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit court split. "Other circuits are equally certain that both extremes are wrong. Unless the court addresses this division, prisoners in some circuits are jurisdictionally denied access to the Rule 60(b) door to the district courthouse, absent fraud, while prisoners in other circuits may have their proper motions decided on the merits."

Habeas petitions have long been the source of controversy because they raise basic questions about the roles of federal and state courts, the finality of the criminal legal process and the efficiency of federal review, according to a 1995 U.S. Department of Justice report.

"It's really a power thing," said veteran New York Times Supreme Court reporter Linda Greenhouse.

"It's demeaning for state courts to have federal courts saying you didn't cross your T's and dot your I's," Greenhouse explained.

"Habeas corpus has become about barriers," said Chicago area lawyer Marie Donnelly, who specializes in habeas law. "Ideally, it's a safety valve; in practice, it's become about federalism and various barriers you have to overcome to even get federal courts to look at your petition."

Critics within both Congress and the Supreme Court complain habeas petitions unduly prolong death row appeals and clog up the court system.

Greenhouse said the Supreme Court has created obstacles to file second habeas petitions through a series of appeals and Congress has done so through legislation like the AEDPA.

Ruling on two other cases consolidated with Gonzalez's, the 11th circuit said "some prisoners disguise second or successive habeas petitions in Rule 60(b)'s clothing" without raising new claims.

Howe said many people, prior to the formation of the AEDPA, grew frustrated by the lack of finality that ensued from multiple post-judgment challenges when defendants who lost on appeal would go on to seek habeas relief repeatedly without raising new issues.

But Howe insists Gonzalez filed a true Rule 60(b) motion and that he has not received a fair chance from the justice system. She said his case deserved to be heard on the merits.

The petition for Supreme Court review of Gonzalez's case argued habeas cases are reheard judicially and second ones are rarely granted except when the merits of the case deem it appropriate and necessary.

Federal judicial caseload statistics show that more than 20,000 habeas petitions are filed annually. In the nine years since AEDPA's inception, roughly 330 of those have been Rule 60(b) motions filed in the context of habeas proceedings, of which 27 have been granted.

"Rule 60(b) does not permit challenges to the underlying conviction on the basis of mistake, excusable neglect, or changes in intervening law; rather, it provides a mechanism for correcting egregious errors only within the habeas process itself," said Howe.

Gonzalez's lawyer said the categorical approach adopted by the 11th circuit closes the door on inmates, without much regard for justice.

"The other circuits very rarely grant 60(b) motions, but at least it's there. It should be available," Howe said. "We need to keep the safety valve open."

On Jan. 14, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted review in the case, limiting review to the first question in Gonzalez's petition.

On June 23, 2005, the Court held 7-2 that Gonzalez's motion was not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition and was not a "claim" of an asserted federal basis for relief. Instead the motion was merely an allegation that the federal courts misapplied the statute of limitations. As such the trial court was correct in denying him relief.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the Court's opinion. Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter dissented.