Alabama v. Bozeman, Michael H. (06/11/2001)
By: Cara M. Aidone, Medill News Service
Questions presented
Does the transfer of a prisoner from federal custody to state custody for one day for the purposes of arraignment, and transfer back to federal custody before disposition of the outstanding charges, require the dismissal of the pending state charges, because it is a violation of the ""anti-shuttling"" provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, even when no harm to the prisoner has been either alleged or demonstrated?
Brief
In 1995, Michael Bozeman committed at least two crimes in the southern Alabama county of Covington. After a complex series of events that included two drug charges and one state shooting charge over the next two years, Bozeman got to turn the tables and accuse the state of Alabama of violating federal law.
On June 15, 1995, Bozeman was arrested on federal charges of intimidating a witness to a shooting that occurred in the small Alabama town of Opp. He was never formally charged for the shooting itself, though a report was filed.
The next day, Bozeman was taken into federal custody on drug charges unrelated to the shooting incident. Bozeman pleaded guilty to these charges on November 3.
Five days later, Bozeman was transferred back to state custody for one day to appear in a Covington County court on unrelated state drug possession charges.
Almost one year later, in September 1996, Bozeman was indicted on state charges stemming from the June 1995 shooting incident.
A few months later, in January 1997, Bozeman was once again transferred from federal to state custody for a day, this time to be arraigned on the 1995 shooting charges.
Bozeman went to trial for the shooting incident in February 1997 and was found guilty.
Following trial, Bozeman filed a motion to dismiss the shooting charges, claiming the January transfer violated federal law.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is an agreement between 48 states, including Alabama, the District of Columbia, and the federal government, to encourage the expeditious disposition of charges against prisoners. The law was enacted to clarify which jurisdictions have authority of prisoners and to avoid delays in charging prisoners in order to not interfere with rehabilitation programs.
Article IV, section 15-9-81(e) of the IAD states: ""If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoners being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.""
In May 1997, the trial court denied Bozemans motion to dismiss the shooting charges and his motion for a new trial. Bozeman appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts ruling.
In an unpublished memorandum, the appellate court stated that despite a technical violation of the law, the IAD statute should not be so narrowly interpreted that its purpose is defeated.
However, the following April, a divided Alabama Supreme Court reversed the appellate courts ruling.
In its per curiam decision, the Alabama Supreme Court stated, ""The IAD is not ambiguous. It would require a tortured reading of the statute for us to conclude, as the State suggests, that a brief violation of the IAD can be ignoredÉWe recognize that some federal courts have ignored the plain meaning of the IAD, butÉwe are under no obligation to follow the interpretation applied by those courts.""
In so holding, the majority recognized that a conflict existed among the federal appeals circuits on how literally to interpret the IAD when technical violations occur.
The dissenters argued that because the IAD is a federal law, it is subject to federal precedent in interpreting the law, and then noted that the majority of federal circuits that have addressed the issue --the 1st, 2nd, 7th, 8th and 9th -- have not required dismissals.
The state of Alabama does not argue that Bozemans interpretation of the IAD is incorrect, and it does not deny violating the statute. Instead, the state argues, as did the dissenters, that because the IAD is a federal law, it is subject to federal interpretation.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on Dec. 11, 2000, and limited review to Question 1 presented by Alabama's petition, as indicated above.
""There was no confusion about who had custody of the defendant, not any interruption of his federal sentence and any rehabilitation or treatment at the time,"" Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor said. ""This is a technical violation where no harm was caused to the defendant, but the State could suffer great harm by being required to let this man and other possible criminals go free.""
Pryor stated that he hoped the U.S. Supreme Court will ""use this case to strike a standard that properly balances the interests of the state and federal governments and defendants.""
On March 26, 2001, the Court allowed the Acting U.S. Solicitor General to file an amicus supporting the state of Alabama, and to split the oral argument time with the state.
On June 11, 2001, the Court unanimously held that under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, states receiving criminal defendants prior to the termination of a sentence in another state may not arraign the defendant and then return the prisoner before trial.
The Court's opinion, written by Justice Stephen Breyer, stressed that the language of the interstate agreement was unambiguous, and that the word ""shall"" militates against any exception even if the shuttling is harmless or minimal.