Artuz, Christopher, Supt. v. Bennett, Tony (11/07/2000)

By: Josh Karp, Medill News Service

Questions presented

Whether a federal habeas petition filed 21 months after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 is time-barred by the tolling provision of the AEDPA?

Brief

In 1984, a jury in Queens County, New York, convicted Tony Bruce Bennett on two counts of attempted murder in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, two counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.

The convictions stemmed from an incident in which Bennett fired two bullets at police during a car chase. Bennett received a sentence of 15 years to life in prison.

In February 1998, Bennett filed a federal habeas corpus petition alleging violations of his rights to present witnesses in his defense and to a fair trial, to be present at all material stages of the trial, and to the effective assistance of counsel.

A federal judge dismissed Bennetts claim as time-barred because it had been filed more than 21 months after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).

The AEDPA imposed a one-year limitations period on habeas petitions that begins to run from the last of several events, including the date on which the challenged state judgment becomes final. That one-year grace period had expired on April 24, 1997, nine months before Bennetts 1998 habeas petition.

Before the enactment of the AEDPA, there had been no formal limit on the time for filing federal habeas petitions. Delayed filings were a basis for dismissal only if the inmate knew or could have known of grounds for its petition earlier and if the state demonstrated that the ""delay prejudiced [it] in its ability to respond to the petition.""

Prior to the 1998 petition, Bennett had appealed his case several times in the New York state courts. In 1987, his conviction was affirmed by the state appellate court and leave to appeal that decision was subsequently denied.

In 1991 Bennett moved the state court to vacate his conviction on the grounds of newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion was again denied.

In 1995, Bennett moved to vacate the judgment once more, this time contending that the trial court had denied him the right to be present at critical stages of his trial and to offer certain testimony at trial. It too was denied, though Bennett claims that after several written requests to the state court for information regarding the disposition of the motion, he received nothing.

Bennetts 1995 motion was not before the federal court when it rejected his habeas petition. The 1995 motion only came to light when he moved the district court for a certificate of appealability, which was granted.

A 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals panel unanimously reversed and remanded the case, holding that Bennetts habeas petition was not time-barred, because his 1995 motion was still ""pending"" under the AEDPAs tolling provision.

The AEDPA provides that ""the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation.""

The 2nd Circuit opinion stated that the ""tolling"" of the limitation period while state claims were ""pending"" upholds the federal policy of ""requiring habeas appellants to exhaust state court remedies prior to initiation suit in federal court,"" wrote Chief Judge Ralph K. Winter.

Essentially, the 2nd Circuit held that because Bennett had not received notification of the state appellate court decision regarding his 1995 motion, the time for appealing the denial of that motion had not yet expired. Thus, Bennetts habeas petition was not untimely because the one-year grace period to file his petition had not yet commenced.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on April 17, 2000. On Aug. 28, the Court allowed the state of Florida to participate in oral arguments as amicus in the case.

On Nov. 7, 2000, the Court unanimously affirmed, finding for Bennett that his application for state postconviction was ""filed,"" as that term is commonly understood, when it was delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record.

The state procedural bars at issue set forth conditions to obtaining relief, rather than conditions to filing, wrote Justice Antonin Scalia for the Court.